Proposal for Aligning Incentives of the Soft DAO Community

My name is Drake at, and I have been actively involved in the crypto community since 2019. I have seen firsthand the importance of community in driving the success of a protocol, and the negative impact that misaligned incentives can have on a community.
I am writing to propose a solution for aligning the incentives of the Soft DAO community with the goals and vision of the organization.


The current state of the Soft DAO community is characterized by a lack of incentives for holding the token and participating in the incubation process.
The only current incentive for community members is “WEN airdrop”, This is not sufficient to encourage long-term engagement and commitment.


To address this issue, I propose the following solutions:
•Introducing a staking mechanism that allows community members to earn rewards for holding the token and supporting the protocol.

•Implementing a revenue share model, where a percentage of the revenue generated by incubated projects is distributed back to the community in the form of staking rewards. Revenue share encourages long term holders by giving a share of earnings, This is also another way to align incentives and is more inclusive.

•Implementing burn/fee mechanisms to incentivize long-term holding of the token. Having a fee/burn mechanism will incentivize long term holders by penalizing those that are just in it for the short term

•To further engage the community Introducing a voting system that allows community members to participate in the decision-making process and vote on which protocols to incubate next. Having a voting system allows community members to have a say in the future of the DAO.


These solutions will align the incentives of community members with the goals and vision of the Soft DAO, which is essential for the long-term success of the organization.
They will also create value for all stakeholders by generating revenue and rewarding those who contribute to the success of the Soft DAO.
Finally, these solutions will help to build a more cohesive and engaged community, which is critical for the future growth of the Soft DAO.


I believe that my proposed solutions are the best approach for aligning the incentives of the Soft DAO community and driving the success of the organization. I am excited about the opportunity to work with the Soft DAO and help the protocol thrive.


Thank you @DOD for taking the time to thoroughly write & articulate your thoughts!

Your solutions definitely make sense. These issues have already been raised several times.

Hopefully, once the transition to the Tally system is complete, we will have a chance to raise these issues and vote :blush:


Drake, thanks for your opinion.

I would like to support the idea of Stacking (including locked assets) - it will protect the token from being dumped at the start of sales and will motivate to keep it further :innocent:


@DOD - thanks so much for writing your thoughts like and sparking this discussion. It’s an honor to have a person with your influence join the community forums and I’m excited to see more engagement like this from new community members in Soft DAO.

A few thoughts on this topic, both for you and for anyone else joining the conversation:

  1. 100%, I agree that I think the community needs to be discussing how to better engage and align incentives beyond simply “WEN airdrop.” Thanks again @DOD for sparking discussion here.
  2. I like the ideas — I’m curious to hear suggestions around the specific details of implementing the mechanisms described (example: how would SOFT staking work, exactly?) Is SOFT just locked up when staking? SOFT isn’t a L1 proof-of-stake, obviously.
  3. Per the SoftDrop Proposal, the DAO is in the process of activating governor contracts

Really looking forward to the community discussing all of these topics more. I think this is a very important topic worth everyone’s attn.


Appreciate the kind words sir its an honor to be here,

For a staking mechanism I believe The best mechanism that has a ve token model with the longer the lock the more voting power ( similar to curve). Also extending on the Ve model can be an implementation of a early exit penalty if a staker wants to exit their position for liquidity. This fee can be distributed back to other stakers as a reward for long term holders, and a portion to the DAO to fund growth.

There are many other mechanisms that can be implemented to further align incentives, but these are just a few that im proposing


Yes, the SoftDrop claims contract already has a voting multiplier in it for all unclaimed tokens. So, there is precedence for something like this in Soft DAO. What kind of vesting timeline and multipliers do you think make the most sense? And what’s a good ballpark range for an early exit fee?

My one concern with the ve staking model is that – in some ways – it feels like it can actually reward mercenaries or those with a short-term mindset.

Here’s what I mean: the community gets excited by the ve model and lots of people lockup their token. At that point, community members who haven’t locked up their token are in a very advantageous position…What do you think about this critique of the ve concept? Have you seen this with other projects you’ve analyzed?


BTW @DOD, check out the recently published RFP for Soft DAO Delegate Statements. If you’re interested in serving the community as a delegate, I’d encourage you to consider submitting a statement.

This could be one way for community members who align with your views to act collectively.


Are there any future rewards for those who vote?
if yes, then in cases where I delegated my tokens to someone, I do not claim this award?

the idea with Deligators (as with validators is very good and if I can get an answer to my question I can make a decision or delegate to myself or in favor of whom I choose

1 Like
  1. The vesting would depend on what your looking for, I believe giving the holder options by allowing them to determine the lock length and rewarding those with more voting power the longer the lock. The multipliers and exit fees would need to be determined based on several factors like token inflation, Token price (determines the APR), length of lock, if there is a vesting period for rewards, ect.

  2. There are always going to be traders that will keep tokens liquid to take advantage of market opportunities. If incentives are properly aligned, and locked holders receive benefits that are greater than being liquid, the community will be happy.

Take curve and convex for example, lockers in the protocols are extremely happy and continue to lock because of the benefits they receive. (look on analytics dashboards to see the rate at which tokens are locked)

Would be happy to jump on a call or help with this